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Abstract—This paper presents XPA (XACML Policy
Analyzer), an open source IDE (Integrated Development
Environment) for testing, debugging, and mutating XACML 3.0
policies. XACML is an OASIS standard for specifying attributebased access control policies. XPA provides a variety of new
techniques for generating test cases from policies, localizing bugs
in faulty policies, and repairing faulty policy elements. XPA has
been applied to numerous XACML policies from the literature
and real-world applications. These policies have been used to
quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of various testing and
debugging methods. For system developers and administrators,
XPA is a practical IDE for developing dependable XACML
policies. For access control researchers, XPA offers a versatile
toolkit for studying and evaluating new testing, debugging, and
verification techniques.
Keywords—access control, XACML, testing, fault localization,
debugging

I. INTRODUCTION
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is a new
generation of access control techniques. It makes authorization
decisions based on attributes of users, resources, actions, and
environments [1]. Due to its fine granularity and high
flexibility, ABAC is playing an increasing role in business and
federal security domains. XACML (eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language) is an OASIS standard for specifying ABAC
policies in the XML format [2]. It has been integrated in major
identity management products, such as Oracle Identity
Manager and WSO2 Identity Server. Although these products
allow user to edit and query XACML policies, there is a lack of
tool support for policy testing, debugging, and evaluation.
The inherent complexity of real-world ABAC policies and
the expressiveness of the XACML language indicate the likely
existence of access control defects and the difficulty in finding
them. The access control defects may result from omission or
misunderstanding of access control requirements, unexpected
interactions between security policy and business logic, and
coding errors. These defects need to be uncovered and fixed
before the system is deployed; otherwise they may lead to
unauthorized access or denial of service. For quality assurance
purposes, we argue that, similar to system and software
development, policy development should follow a rigorous
engineering process, including requirements analysis, design
(e.g., decomposition and modularization), coding (e.g., in the
XACML language), validation (e.g., testing and debugging),
deployment and maintenance. Thus, an integrated development
environment (IDE) is needed to provide computer-aided
support for various activities in this engineering process.
This work was supported in part by US National Science Foundation
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This paper presents XPA (XACML Policy Analyzer), an
evolving IDE for the development and implementation of
dependable XACML policies. It consists of a variety of tools
for editing, compiling, testing, debugging, and mutating
XACML policies. The main features are: (1) coverage-based
test generation using a constraint solver for XACML policies,
(2) mutation-based test generation using a constraint solver for
XACML policies, (3) coverage-based fault localization of
XACML policies, and (4) mutation-based repair of XACML
policies. The underlying technical approach of each feature
implies substantial research effort and its elaboration requires a
separate paper. The fault localization and repair methods for
debugging XACML policies appeared in our previous work [3]
[4], but their implementations have been improved for
efficiency and user-friendliness. The policy mutator in XPA is
currently the only one that supports XACML 3.0 and secondorder mutation (i.e., application of two mutation operators).
Other mutation tools for XACML [5][6] can only apply one
mutation operator to XACML 1.0 and 2.0 policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II gives a brief introduction to XACML policies.
Section III presents the architecture of XPA, Section IV
describes the mutation tool for XACML 3.0 policies. Sections
V and VI present coverage-based and mutation-based test
generators, respectively. Sections VII introduces fault localizer
and policy repairer. Section VIII summarizes the evaluations of
XPA. Section IX reviews and compares related work. Section
X concludes this paper.
II. XACML POLICIES
The first class entities in XACML are policy and policy set.
A policy set consists of a policy set target, a policy-combining
algorithm identifier, a list of policies or policy sets, an
obligation expression, and an advice expression. Policy set
target, obligation expression, and advice expression are
optional. An obligation expression describes the string attached
to the access privilege, whereas an advice expression describes
an optional suggestion on the access. A policy comprises a
policy target, a rule-combining algorithm identifier, a list of
rules, an obligation expression, and an advice expression. A
rule consists of a target, a condition, an effect (permit or deny),
an obligation expression, and an advice expression. The rule
target specifies the set of requests to which the rule is intended
to apply. The rule condition refines the applicability of the rule
established by the rule target. The target of a rule, policy, or
policy set is a conjunctive sequence of AnyOf clauses. Each
AnyOf clause is a disjunctive sequence of AllOf clauses, and
each AllOf clause is a conjunctive sequence of match

predicates. A match predicate compares attribute values in an
access request with the embedded attributes. Logical
expressions for match predicates and rule conditions can apply
a great variety of predefined functions and data types (such as
string, Boolean, integer, double, time, and dates) to attributes.
XACML provides four pre-defined categories of attributes:
subject, resource, action, and environment. It also allows user
to introduce additional attribute categories.
When an access request is fed to an XACML engine that is
running a policy set or policy, the engine will return an access
decision (permit, deny, not applicable, or indeterminate) per
the policy set or policy. The decision may be attached with
obligation or advice, depending on the policy or policy set. An
access request consists of a list of attribute names, types, and
values. In this paper, it is also call test input, specified in a text
file. A complete test case is composed of both test input and
expected access decision (i.e., oracle value). The oracle value
for a test input is usually determined by the access control
requirements of the system under development. When a policy
set or policy is known to be correct (e.g., for experiment
purposes), the actual response of the policy set or policy can be
recorded and then used as the oracle value of the corresponding
test input. In an evolving policy development process, the
actual access decisions of test inputs from earlier policy
versions can be recorded and then used as the oracle values of
corresponding test inputs for testing the current or future
versions if their correctness has been confirmed before. Given
a test case for a policy set or policy, the actual response
returned by the XACML engine depends on the evaluation of
all policy elements. Consider a typical policy set with a list of
policies, where each policy is composed of a list of rules. The
final access decision per the policy set depends the evaluation
results of the policy set target, access decisions of individual
policies within the policy set, and the policy combining
algorithm. The access decision of each individual policy
depends on the evaluation results of the policy target, access
decisions of individual rules in the policy, and the rule
combining algorithm. XCAML3.0 provides 11 rule combining
algorithms and 12 policy combining algorithms. The most
commonly used combining algorithms are Deny-overrides,
Permit-overrides, First-applicable, Deny-unless-permit, and
Permit-unless-deny.
III. THE ARCHITECTURE OF XPA
Figure 1 shows the architecture of XPA. The main
components are: editor, test runner, fault localizer, policy
repairer, policy mutator, mutation-based test generators, and
coverage-based test generators. It is implemented in Java and
AspectJ (an aspect-oriented extension to Java). The editor is
adapted from the open source project UMU-XACML-Editor
[7], which was originally developed for XACML 1.0 and 2.0.
The XACML engine is Balana [8], the only open source
implementation for XACML 3.0 when we started this project.
The test runner feeds a test suite to the XACML engine
running a policy set or policy and reports the pass/fail result of
each test. For a test case without an oracle value (expected
response), the actual response is recorded. For a test case with
an oracle value, the test runner also compares the oracle value
with the actual response and makes a verdict of pass or fail.

The failure of a test case indicates that the policy or policy set
under test has one or more faults if the test input and the oracle
value are both correct.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of XPA

When there is a test failure, the fault localizer can be used
to pinpoint the possible locations of faults (e.g., policy
elements in the policy or policy set under test). It ranks all
policy elements in the descending order of their suspicion
scores calculated from the execution of the entire test suite.
The user can then examine the top-ranked elements to
determine whether they are faulty and how to fix them.
Because Balana does not keep track of test execution
information, we use an aspect-oriented instrumentation
technique in AspectJ to monitor the evaluation result of each
policy element when each test case is executed. This technique
does not need to modify the source code of Balana.
The policy repairer takes a step further, aiming to repair a
faulty policy automatically. It attempts to make a series of
changes to the faulty policy, i.e., mutate the faulty policy, so as
to make all test cases pass. The repair attempt may or may not
be successful, depending on the faults. Note that automatic
repair is a hard problem. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first effort toward automatic repair of XACML
policies and policy sets. The current repairer can fix a fault
policy with no more than two simple faults. A simple fault is
one that can be corrected by one mutation operation.
The policy mutator is a program that generates mutants of a
given policy or policy set. Each mutant is a variation of the
original policy or policy set. A first-order mutant is obtained by
applying one mutation operator to make one change, whereas a
second-order mutant is created by applying two mutation
operators to make two changes. As the mutants of a correct
policy contain different types of faults, they are commonly
used to evaluate the effectiveness of a testing method, i.e., how
many faults can be detected.
XPA also exploits policy mutation for test generation
purposes. Given an original policy and its mutant, a mutationbased test generator produces an access request such that the
two policies yield different responses. To do so, it first collects
the constraint on attributes by comparing the two policy
versions and then feeds the constraint to Z3 to find attribute
values to satisfy the constraint, and converts the result into an
access request. For a set of policy mutants, the mutation-based
test generators can produce an optimal test suite that reveal all
faulty mutants. This test suite can be used to test a policy or

policy set without knowing whether the policy or policy set is
faulty. It can also be used to measure other testing methods. Z3
is an SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) Solver from
Microsoft Research [9]. It is worth pointing out that, although
policy mutation is commonly used for evaluating testing
methods in the literature, mutation-based test generation and
mutation-based policy repair in our work are new.

request. Mutants of a correct policy set or policy are commonly
used for evaluating the fault detection capability of a testing
method in term of mutation score. A mutant is said to be killed
if a failure is reported by any test case produced by the testing
method. A mutant that is not killed may be equivalent to the
original policy. Given a test suite produced by a testing
method, its mutation score or mutant-killing ratio is as follows:

Coverage-based test generators are a set of programs that
generate a test suite from a given policy or policy set according
to a chosen coverage criterion. The main coverage criteria are
rule coverage, rule pair coverage, permit/deny rule pair
coverage, decision coverage, MC/DC (modified-condition and
decision coverage), non-error decision coverage, and non-error
MC/DC. Each coverage-based test generator first collects the
constraints on attributes according to the chosen coverage
criterion, feeds each constraint to Z3, and converts the result
into an access request. The coverage-based test generators
focus on the extent to which the policy elements are exercised
by tests, whereas the mutation-based test generators aim to
produce tests that can reveal hypothesized faults. Both are
useful for quality assurance of XACML policies.

number of killed mutants
total number of mutants – number of equivalent mutants

IV. POLICY MUTATOR
The policy mutator creates mutants of a policy set or policy
by applying mutation operators to the policy set or policy.
Mutation operators are defined with respect to a fault model,
which represents a comprehensive set of fault types in
XACML. Table I shows the fault model (i.e., column 1) and
mutation operators for each fault type. Application of one
mutation operator may result in a number of mutants. For
example, the rule combining algorithm of a policy can be
changed to any of the other rule combining algorithms.
TABLE I.

FAULT MODEL AND MUTATION OPERATORS

Fault type
Incorrect policy/
policy set target
Incorrect
rule/policy
combining
algorithm
Incorrect rule
effect
Incorrect rule
target
Incorrect rule
condition
Incorrect rule
ordering
Missing rule
Missing target
element

Name
PTT
PTF

Mutation operator
Mutation
set Policy/set Target True
set Policy/set Target False

CRC

Change Rule/Policy Combining algorithm

CRE

Change Rule Effect

RTT
RTF
RCT
RCF
ANF
RNF
FPR
FDR
RER

set Rule Target True
set Rule Target False
set Rule Condition True
set Rule Condition False
Add Not Function in condition
Remove Not Function in condition
First Permit Rules
First Deny Rules
REmove a Rule

RPTE

Remove Parallel Target Element

Mutation operators in Table I are named with respect to
correct policy sets and policies. Mutants of a correct policy set
or policy may or may not contain faults. It is possible that a
mutant is functionally equivalent to its original version, i.e.,
they always yield the same access decision for any access

Note that mutation operators can be applied to a policy set
or policy no matter whether the policy set or policy is known to
be correct or faulty. In particular, XPA applies mutation to test
generation (Section VI) and policy repair (Section VII). In
these cases, the fault types in Table I do not represent the
meanings of mutation operators.
V. COVERAGE-BASED TEST GENERATORS
The coverage-based test generators produce access requests
from a given policy set or policy to satisfy a chosen coverage
criterion. As policies are special cases of policy sets, we
describe the coverage criteria with respect to policy sets.
Rule coverage: A test suite for a policy set is said to satisfy
rule coverage of the policy set if, for each rule in each policy of
the policy set, there is as least one test in the test suite that
evaluates the rule to its specified effect (permit or deny).
Decision coverage: A test suite for a policy set is said to
satisfy decision coverage of the policy set if the test suite
covers all three decisions (true, false, error) of each decision
expression, including the policy set target, the target of each
policy, the target and condition of each rule in each policy.
Non-error decision coverage: A test suite for a policy set
is said to satisfy non-error decision coverage of the policy set
if the test suite covers all non-error decisions (true and false)
of each decision expression, including the policy set target, the
policy target of each policy, the rule target and condition of
each rule in each policy.
MC/DC: A test suite for a policy set is said to satisfy
MC/DC of the policy set if the test suite satisfies MC/DC and
covers the error condition of each decision expression,
including the policy set target, the policy target of each policy,
the rule target and condition of each rule in each policy.
Non-error MC/DC: A test suite for a policy set is said to
satisfy MC/DC of the policy set if the test suite satisfies
MC/DC of each decision expression, including the policy set
target, the policy target of each policy, the rule target and
condition of each rule in each policy.
Rule pair coverage: A test suite for a policy set is said to
satisfy rule pair coverage of the policy set if, for each pair of
rules within each policy, the test suite has a test to make both
rules evaluate to their specified effects.
The above coverage criteria can also be used to measure the
coverage adequacy of a given test suite. Such a test suite may
be produced by other testing methods when a policy is
developed or represent actual access requests in operation.

Generally speaking, test suites of different coverage criteria
have different levels of fault detection capabilities. The
measurement of coverage adequacy provides important
guidelines for the development of access control tests.
VI. MUTATION-BASED TEST GENERATORS
Given a policy set or policy whose correctness is unknown,
mutation-based test generators create access requests by
comparing the policy set or policy with each of its mutants
(i.e., a hypothesized fault). The mutants are obtained by
applying the mutation operators in Table I. A mutation-based
test generator with respect to a mutation operator tries to
generate one access request for each mutant obtained by the
mutation operator. For such an access request, the original
version and the mutant will respond with different access
decisions. Assuming that one version is correct and the other
version is faulty, the idea of mutation-based test generation
relies on the following fault detection conditions: (1)
Reachability condition: the access request must reach the
mutated policy element, such as rule target, rule condition,
rule effect, policy target, policy set target, and rule/policy
combining algorithm. (2) Necessity condition: the access
request must make the mutated element and the corresponding
element in the original version evaluate to different
intermediate results; (3) Propagation condition: the access
request must make the mutant and the original produce
different responses. Propagation condition largely depends on
the rule and policy combining algorithms.
By comparing the two policy versions, the mutation-based
test generator derives a constraint that is composed of all three
conditions. Then it feeds the constraint to Z3. If the constraint
is solved, the solution is converted into an access request;
otherwise the two policy versions are considered to be
equivalent, assuming Z3 is sound and complete.
The key challenge of mutation-based test generation is the
formalization of reachability condition, necessity condition,
and propagation condition for each kind of mutants. The idea
originated from fault-based testing or constraint-based testing
in the software testing community. However, practical
mutation-based test generators for software remain to be seen
unless for toy examples – it is difficult, if not impossible, to
formulate the fault detection conditions because of the inherent
complexity of software. Due to the special structure of
XACML policy sets and policies, we have been able to
automatically derive complete fault detection conditions of all
mutants. The details will be described in a separate paper.

scoring methods selected from the best-performing spectrumbased methods for software fault localization [10].
The policy repairer takes a step further to modify the policy
set or policy so that no test in the test suite will fail. According
to the suspicion rankings from the fault localizer, the repairer
starts with the most suspicious policy element, mutates it to
create a new policy set or policy, and runs the new policy set or
policy to check if all tests pass. If there is no failure, the repair
is successful; otherwise the repairer will try another mutation
or another suspicious element. Because a policy set or policy
may have a number of faults, the repairer exploits the notion of
plausible fix. A plausible fix does not make all tests pass.
Instead, it makes the debugging progressive, indicated by a
decreased number of failed tests. The repairer allows user to set
up the depth of mutation for repair, a scoring method for
sorting suspicious elements, and select some or all of the
mutation operators. If the repair attempt is successful, XPA
presents the relevant policy elements of both original and
repaired versions.
VIII. EVALUATION AND APPLICATION
We have applied a number of XACML policies to XPA, as
listed in Table II. All of them are available at the project
website. Three policies, continue, fedora, and itrust, were
obtained from the literature. They were originally coded in 1.0
or 2.0. We upgraded them to 3.0 without changing their
semantics. We also created three variations of itrust (itrust5,
itrust10, and itrust20) for studying scalability of testing and
debugging methods. itrustX has X times as many rules as itrust.
The new rules are created by replicating original rules with
new attribute values. HL7 is a real world policy set provided by
an XACML developer. The system that uses the HL7 policy
set is not available, though. GPMS (Grant Proposal
Management System) is an open source Java project that we
have developed as an exemplar application of XACML. The
motivation behind GPMS was that there is no real-world
XACML3.0 application whose policy files and application
source code are publicly available. GPMS is a web-based
application for an academic institution to manage the internal
workflow for grant submissions. It uses XACML to implement
a fine-grained access control of the workflow.
TABLE II.
Policy

VII. AUTOMATED DEBUGER
The automated debugger consists of the fault localizer and
the mutation-based policy repairer. Fault localizer aims to
identify which element of a policy set or policy is likely faulty
if there is a failure when it is tested with a test suite. The basic
idea is to build a correlation between the evaluation result
(firing or not) of each policy element and the test verdict (pass
or fail) for each test case. The correlation data is then used to
rank all policy elements with a certain scoring method. A
policy element with a high suspicion score has a high
probability of having fault(s). XPA has implemented 14

SAMPLE XACML3.0 POLICIES

# of rules

# of lines of the XACML file

continue

15

229

fedora1

12

227

itrust2

64

1,283

itrust5

320

6,403

itrust10

640

12,803

itrust20

1,280

25,603

HL7

19

809

GPMS policy

97

7,678

Evaluation of the coverage-based test generators: Six
policies (continue, fedora, itrust, itrust5, itrust10, and itrust20)
1
2

http://www.fedora.info
http://agile.csc.ncsu.edu/iTrust/wiki/doku.php?id=start

have been used to evaluate all coverage-based test generators.
As they are considered to be the correct version, the oracle
value of each test input is the actual response from the original
policy. The fault detection capability of each test generator is
assessed through mutation testing, where both first-order and
second-order mutants were generated by the policy mutator.
The results show that the MC/DC test suite has the highest
mutation score, whereas the rule coverage test suite was only
able to kill about 50% of the mutants. All test generators have
acceptable time performance for all policies.
Evaluation of the mutation-based test generators: All
policies in Table II have been applied to the mutation-based
test generators. They are able to generate a test input for every
non-equivalent first-order mutants.
Evaluation of the fault localizer: All policies except
itrust20 and the GPMS policy in Table II have been applied to
the fault localizer. The first-order and second-order mutants of
each policy are used as inputs to the fault localizer. The
experiments show that the 14 scoring methods have varying
accuracy. Naish2 and CBI-Inc can accurately localize the faults
regardless of the policy size. The actual faulty policy element
is usually among a few top candidates that are suggested by the
Naish2 and CBI-Inc methods.
Evaluation of the policy repairer: All policies except
itrust20 and the GPMS policy in Table II have been applied to
the policy repair. Both first-order and second-order mutants of
each policy are used as inputs. All scoring methods were able
to repair them. This indicates that the mutation operators for
policy mutation and the mutation operators for policy repair are
reversible. The Naish2 and CBI-Inc methods have the best time
performance to locate the faulty elements.
Application to GPMS: XPA was used to test the GPMS
policy in the development process of GPMS. The mutants of
the GPMS policy is currently being used to evaluate the fault
detection capability of a model-based test method for GPMS.
IX. RELATED WORK
Several methods have been proposed to generate test inputs
for XACML policies: Cirg [11] generates access requests from
counterexamples produced by the change-impact analysis of
two synthesized versions. The difference of the two versions of
a policy targets a test coverage goal (e.g., rule, or condition).
Because access requests are encoded in XML, they must
conform to the XML Context Schema. Bertolino et al., have
developed different test generation algorithms by considering
the structures of the Context Schema, such as Preliminary XPT
and Incremental XPT [12]. Li et al. [8] used symbolic
execution technique to generate access requests by converting
the XACML policy under test into semantically equivalent C
Code Representation (CCR) and symbolically executing CCR
to create test inputs and translating the test inputs to access
requests. The coverage-based test generators in XPA are
different from the above work except for the rule coverage. In
addition to the new coverage criteria, XPA generates access
requests for exercising error conditions. Policy mutation has

been used to evaluate the above testing methods, but limited to
1.0 and 2.0 [5][6]. XPA also uses policy mutation for test
generation and policy repair.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a comprehensive toolkit, XPA, for
editing, testing, debugging, and mutating XACML policies. It
also provides an infrastructure for experimentation with new
testing and debugging methods. For example, when mutation is
used to evaluate a new testing method against a policy, XPA
can apply the test suite to all mutants of all or selected mutation
operators and produce a summary of test execution results.
Our future work will focus on tool support for access
control requirements analysis and policy maintenance in the
policy engineering process. We plan to develop a computeraided approach for transforming access control requirements
specification in a natural language (e.g., English) into XACML
policies. We will also implement various refactoring methods
to facilitate changes of XACML policies.
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